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PATHWAYS ACROSS THE VALLEY OF DEATH

INTRODUCTION
Most therapeutic interventions produced by pharmaceutical firms take the
form of small molecule drugs,1 which are mass produced at low marginal cost
and ingested orally. Drug therapies typically work by affecting the activity of
human proteins, known in the industry as targets,2 that have been implicated in
disease pathways. Thus far, medical science has identified safe and effective
therapies for only a few hundred of the estimated 3000 protein targets in the human genome that are potentially susceptible to a drug.3 Moreover, pharmaceutical firms have encountered major obstacles in producing fundamentally new
small molecule drugs, especially those that work against new targets. According
to one report, an average of only three drugs that act on novel targets have
reached the market annually in recent years.4
This highly visible problem has attracted commentary in scholarly articles,5
1. We use the term “small molecule” to distinguish that class of compounds that can alter the
activity of DNA or proteins but are not themselves proteins, peptides, or nucleic acids.
2. Ideally, potential targets would include not only individual proteins but also protein-protein
interactions. See Michelle R. Arkin & James A. Wells, Small-Molecule Inhibitors of ProteinProtein Interactions: Progressing Towards the Dream, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 301
(2004).
3. Adrian Whitty & Gnanasambandam Kumaravel, Between a Rock and a Hard Place?, 2
NATURE CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 112, 112 (2006) (giving an estimate of about three hundred proteins);
Andreas P. Russ & Stefan Lampel, The Druggable Genome: An Update, 10 DRUG DISCOVERY
TODAY 1607 (2005). Under the definition used in this Article, susceptibility to a drug, or “druggability,” is defined by whether the protein is capable of binding a chemical compound. This definition does not address the question of whether the binding will yield a result that is biologically useful.
4. See Brian P. Zambrowicz & Arthur T. Sands, Knockouts Model the 100 Best-Selling
Drugs—Will They Model the Next 100?, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 38, 39 (2003); see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS,
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT
EFFORTS 1 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/d0749.pdf (stating that FDA submissions for new chemical molecules have generally declined
since 1995, even though industry research and development increased 147% in inflation-adjusted
dollars between 1993 and 2004). New chemical molecules are drugs that differ fundamentally in
structure from prior molecules. They are, therefore, the type of drugs that are most likely to be active against new targets (or show substantially increased efficacy against old targets).
5. See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 10, 11; Fredric J. Cohen, Macrotrends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 78 (2005); Robert F. Service, Surviving the Blockbuster
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government white papers,6 and the popular press.7 Government agencies, such as
the National Institutes of Health,8 and industry insiders,9 have also recognized
that one of the most serious pitfalls involves the difficulty of moving across the
so-called “valley of death” that separates upstream research on promising genes,
proteins, and biological pathways from downstream drug candidates. For example, an upstream finding that a given protein is differentially expressed in individuals with a particular disease may suggest that the protein merits further investigation. However, much more work (especially medicinal chemistry) is
necessary to determine how good a target the protein really is and whether a
marketable drug candidate that affects the activity of the protein is likely to be
developed.
As industry observers have noted, successfully translating upstream research
into potential drugs will require experimentation with new models of research
and development (R&D).10 In this Article, we propose one such initiative: intensive, large-scale collaboration between academics, who possess unique skills in
designing assays that can identify promising targets, and pharmaceutical firms
that hold libraries of potentially useful small molecules as trade secrets, making
them largely off limits to these same academic scientists.
As we discuss below, conventional patent-based strategies for commercialization of university research, of the type envisioned by statutes like the BayhDole Act of 1980,11 are unlikely to foster such intensive collaboration. Moreover,
while R&D alliances between small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceuti-

Syndrome, 203 SCIENCE 1796 (2004) (discussing low numbers of new chemical entities approved in
recent years).
6. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS (2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Billion Dollar Pills, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 69, 70 (“With its traditional
approach, Big Pharma is not coming up with new drugs fast enough to fill its pipeline.”).
8. See, e.g., Christopher Austin et al., NIH Molecular Libraries Initiative, 306 SCIENCE 1138
(2004); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 40 (noting importance of “translational medicine”
for addressing the drug discovery problem).
9. See, e.g., Christopher A. Lipinski, The Anti-Intellectual Effects of Intellectual Property, 10
CURRENT OPINION IN CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 380 (2006).
10. See, e.g., DataMonitor, Addressing Pharma's R&D Productivity Crisis: Technical and Strategic Initiatives To Improve Core Drug Discovery Capabilities, http://www.market-researchreport.com/datamonitor/DMHC1960.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007) (noting that “[c]ompanies must
fundamentally review R&D business models and exploit new strategies for re-establishing core
drug discovery expertise”).
11. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
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cal companies can perhaps fill some of the collaboration gap, thus far these vertical alliances have not appreciably stimulated productivity in the area of small
molecules.12 To achieve the goal of inducing more well-trained “eyes” to search
chemical space for useful molecules, we need a contract-based platform that
makes these molecules broadly available to academic experts without compromising future patents.
The collaborative initiative we propose takes its inspiration from existing
horizontal collaborations between pharmaceutical firms, which focus on identifying markers of drug safety and efficacy. However, our proposed effort aims to
identify potential drugs that may someday reach the market and generate revenue. We therefore need to define ownership more deliberately than do current
collaborations, which focus on information that is generally considered precompetitive at all stages. Although firms would not bring specific patents to the
table ex ante (as they do, for example, in most vertical R&D alliances between
smaller biotechnology firms and larger pharmaceutical companies),13 future intellectual property rights would nonetheless be suitably allocated among collaborators.14 Moreover, unlike existing horizontal collaborations that have focused on
safety and efficacy issues, our proposed initiative would deliberately integrate
12. These alliances have been more successful in increasing productivity in the area of biological macromolecules (a class of specialty drugs known as “biologics”) like proteins and large peptides. See Cockburn, supra note 5, at 12, 14; Service, supra note 5, at 1797-98. However, such biologics are expensive to develop and hence quite costly to patients (with prices ranging from
thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars for an annual supply). Moreover, the absence of a
generic regime for biologics, see infra note 29, means that their prices do not decrease to any meaningful extent even after patents expire. See, e.g., Geeta Anand, As Costs Rise, New Medicines Face
Pushback, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at A1 (making these points and noting that spending on
specialty drugs rose twenty-one percent in 2006, as contrasted with six percent for non-generic,
non-specialty (i.e., small molecule) drugs); Geeta Anand, Rx for an Industry: As Biotech Drug
Prices Surge, U.S. Is Hunting for a Solution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Anand,
Rx for an Industry] (noting that spending on specialty drugs represents twenty-five percent of national spending on biopharmaceuticals).
13. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Strategic Alliances, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 303, 308
n.29 (noting that in a sample of 125 genomics alliances, 113 involved the licensing of intellectual
property by smaller technology firms); cf. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technological Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUST. ECON. 125,
132 (1998) (noting that biotechnology firms with more intellectual property rights exercised more
control over the alliance).
14. See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-55 (1995)
(discussing the importance of ex ante property rights allocation). Ex ante, the information at issue
in our proposal is not patentable. Boilerplate patent law does not allow patents on biochemical inventions of unknown function. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097-99
(Jan. 5, 2001).
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academic scientists as a built-in vertical component.
We situate our proposal in the economic literature that has analyzed transaction costs and incomplete contracting in the context of inter-firm R&D alliances.15 The inter-firm alliance we propose would simultaneously redound to the
financial benefit of the pharmaceutical industry and promote the interests of public sector researchers. Most importantly, under our scheme intellectual property
would be used creatively to secure efficient pathways across the gap that separates upstream research from downstream products—a gap so economically perilous that it has earned the “valley of death” moniker.16 If these arrangements
generated a larger number of efficacious drugs, the public at large would become
the ultimate beneficiary.
In Part I, we frame the problem and describe some alternative efforts, existing and proposed, to accelerate drug development. In Part II, we examine several
new pharmaceutical industry collaborations that provide some precedent for our
proposed collaboration. In Part III, we set out our proposed multi-firm collaboration model. Finally, in Part IV, we discuss the perspectives of various stakeholders (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, academic researchers, nonprofit fun15. See, e.g., Suzanne Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Incomplete Contracting and the
Structure of R&D Joint Venture Contracts, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
201 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004) (arguing that the allocation of property rights in innovation generated by R&D partners is an important part of contract design, particularly in patent sensitive industries like the biopharmaceutical industry); Rachelle Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance
in R&D Alliances, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 484 (2004) (finding that alliance governance based on
transaction cost arguments substantially improves collaborative benefits). The economic literature
on incomplete contracting grows out of the literature on transaction cost economics (TCE). Both
literatures emphasize the ex ante and ex post transaction cost challenges that managing uncertain
future conditions poses for efficient contracting. Unlike the TCE literature, however, the property
rights strand of the incomplete contracting literature tends to stress the role of ex ante property
rights allocation. A related literature discusses how the availability of statutory intellectual property
rights (typically patent rights) in modular information defines the boundaries of the firm and may
also facilitate inter-firm market transactions. See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001); Ashish Arora &
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575. This
literature is not as directly relevant to our proposal, as we do not purport to alter the statutory standards by which patent rights are granted or propose new statutory rights.
16. Although we focus here on translation of biological research into small molecule drugs, the
term “valley of death” is widely used to describe difficulties of market translation across different
fields of scientific endeavor. See, e.g., COMM. ON ACCELERATING TECH TRANSITION, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION: BRIDGING THE VALLEY OF DEATH
FOR MATERIALS AND PROCESSES IN DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2004).
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ders), with a view toward finding common ground on which to develop the proposed public-private partnership. We also discuss the possibility of single firm
public-private partnerships, which could represent a desirable option if a comparison of pharmaceutical firm libraries showed substantial overlap among them.
We conclude by considering briefly antitrust concerns as well as the broader implications of the collaborative framework we construct for small molecule libraries.
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Biomedical research in the pharmaceutical industry mainly focuses on small
molecule chemical compounds. In contrast with proteins or other biologics, small
molecule chemicals are usually mass produced at low marginal cost and are taken
17
orally. Many pharmaceutical firms own collections, or “libraries,” of hundreds
of thousands of small molecules that they have either synthesized internally or
have purchased from outside vendors. Because the functional attributes of these
molecules have not generally been studied in any depth, they typically do not
meet even the relatively lax standards for patentability currently applied by the
18
courts. To protect their investment, firms impose a strict regime of trade secrecy.
In order to test the molecules for biological activity pertaining to disease
processes, pharmaceutical firms must screen them against interesting proteins.
The experimental protocol under which a target protein is screened is known as
an assay. For the past few decades, pharmaceutical firms have been using high19
throughput screening (HTS) of small molecule libraries against assays containing target proteins to identify promising compounds that may lead to patentable
drugs. HTS allows researchers to examine the interaction between the subject of
the assay and all of the many thousands of small molecules housed in a single li17. The systemic bioavailability of small molecules tends to be greater as well. Depending on
their construction, small molecules may simply diffuse through tissues, whereas proteins must be
transported.
18. See generally In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding the patentability
requirement of utility met where molecule in question had shown cancer-fighting properties in a
mouse model).
19. See Konrad H. Bleicher et al., Hit and Lead Generation: Beyond High-Throughput Screening, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 369 (2003); W. Patrick Walters & Mark Namchuk, Designing Screens: How To Make Your Hits a Hit, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 259 (2003). The
initial mechanical problem presented by high-throughput screening of thousands of chemical compounds was solved by the use of robotic devices. Current state-of-the-art scanners use robotics to
test more than one million compounds per day against various assays. See Gretchen Vogel, NIH
Gears Up for Chemical Genomics, 304 SCIENCE 1728 (2004).
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brary in only a few hours, which vastly increases the scope of potentially useful
information available to scientists. However, despite explosive growth in genomic and proteomic information about potential targets, and increasing levels of
20
R&D spending, results of the HTS approach have thus far been disappointing.
As noted earlier, the production of drugs that work against new targets has been
21
particularly difficult.
The pharmaceutical firms’ failure to find new drugs has been accompanied
by a significant decline in sales revenues on existing drugs. Large pharmaceutical
firms have typically generated very high sales revenues (and profits) through patents on so-called blockbuster drugs that they can market to large population segments. Prominent examples of blockbuster drugs include cholesterol-lowering
agents, anti-hypertensives, and antidepressants. But patents on many blockbust22
ers are now expiring. Moreover, insurers are becoming reluctant to pay high
prices for so-called “me-too” drugs—new products that represent mere incre23
mental improvements over existing molecules. In order to maintain profitability, pharmaceutical firms must produce fundamentally new molecules that address new targets and thus represent substantial improvements over existing
treatment.
A. The Dearth of Drugs Against New Targets
Although the genome is estimated to contain at least 3000 druggable targets,
20. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4.
21. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Bleicher, supra note 19, at 370
(“[D]espite the massive growth in screening compound numbers over the past 15-20 years, no corresponding increase in successfully launched new chemical entities has resulted.”). See generally
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 6.
22. See Adam Smith, Generic Drug Flood Headed Our Way, CNN MONEY, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/03/news/fortune500/generic/ (quoting drug industry analyst Andrew
Forman of W.R. Hambrecht & Co. for the proposition that $100 billion worth of brand name drugs
will lose patent protection between 2006 and 2010).
23. In 2005, sixty-eight percent of employers who provided insurance reported using tiered
programs of co-payment to encourage the purchase of inexpensive pharmaceuticals (either generics
or brand name drugs on which discounts had been negotiated). David Blumenthal, EmployerSponsored Insurance—Riding the Health Care Tiger, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 195, 199 (2006). Historically, the market signals sent to pharmaceutical firms have been less than efficient. Not only
have health care payers generally been reluctant to use cost-effectiveness analysis in determining
coverage, but the information necessary for determining cost-effectiveness—a public good—has
been undersupplied. Jerry Avorn, Sending Pharma Better Signals, 309 SCIENCE 669 (2005). However, this situation may be changing. See id. Moreover, at least in some cases, incremental improvements may not even be patentable. See, e.g., Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(holding that a new salt form of an existing chemical compound was not patentable).
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24

only a few hundred proteins are fully validated in the sense that they are shown
to be biologically interesting and also susceptible to regulation by metabolically
accessible, non-toxic drugs. Despite the infusion of new information about possible targets, some pharmaceutical companies continue to focus on this group of a
few hundred, already validated targets. While this strategy may indicate excessive risk-aversion, the fact that health insurance companies were once willing to
pay high prices for me-too drugs remains a factor. Validating new targets is also
more risky and complex now than in the past. Many observers believe most of
the “low hanging fruit”—that is, targets that can be readily modulated by welltolerated, simple chemicals—has been found. This tendency to focus on a small
number of known targets means that insufficient research has been undertaken on
25
new targets.
A number of discovery-oriented pharmaceutical firms continue to engage in
target validation using in-house biological and chemical expertise. So do some
small biotechnology firms. For the latter, patents on new targets can serve as the
basis for both arms-length licensing and more vertically integrated R&D alliances with pharmaceutical firms. One empirical study indicates that biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms formed more than 1000 such two-firm alliances
between 1993 and 2000.26 Despite these alliances, which may be responsible for
a growing pool of therapeutics that are biological macromolecules,27 very few
new small molecule drugs have emerged.28 Given escalating health care expenditures, this dearth of cost-effective small molecules, which (unlike biologics) can
be made at low marginal cost after relevant patents expire,29 is particularly unfor24. See Whitty & Kumaravel, supra note 3.
25. See, e.g., Cockburn, supra note 5, at 12. It is theoretically possible that the low-hanging
fruit that has already been found represents the sum total of biological targets on which research is
justified as an economic matter. In other words, the costs of doing further research may exceed the
health benefits achieved by any new drugs that might be found. There is little evidence to back this
hypothesis, however.
26. Matthew J. Higgins, The Allocation of Control Rights in Pharmaceutical Alliances (Soc.
Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No. 918980, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=918980 (describing an empirical study using data from Recombinant Capital, a California-based
biotechnology consulting firm). For a discussion of such licensing and alliance activity at one of its
historical spikes (around 2000-2001) see Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 815-18 (2001).
27. See Anand, Rx for an Industry, supra note 12 (noting the twenty-five percent market share
now held by specialty drugs, primarily biologics).
28. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4.
29. Currently, there is no generic biologics regime. Moreover, even if a generic biologics regime were established, bioequivalence is likely to be harder to prove in the context of biologics
than in the context of small molecules. In any given case, the FDA may require clinical trials to
demonstrate comparable safety and efficacy. This will create a barrier to entry for generic competi-
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tunate.
Moreover, while biotechnology firms could previously use early stage patents to secure venture capital funding or form vertical alliances, such patents no
longer guarantee either funding or an alliance. Industry analysts have recently
emphasized the biomedical “funding gap” resulting from the increasing reluctance of venture capital and pharmaceutical firms to invest far upstream.30
The failure of efforts to fill the small molecule pipeline may prove to be a
transient phenomenon, particularly if the integration of information technology
accelerates drug development efforts. However, despite optimistic predictions in
the past,31 information technology has not yet yielded significant efficiencies.
This failure makes experimentation with supplementary approaches imperative.
Another candidate for undertaking financially risky target validation is academia. Indeed, a key economic argument for public funding of science is that the
private sector will tend to undersupply research with uncertain commercial potential.32 Even though it may need some assistance in identifying which targets
are most likely to bind drug-like molecules, the academic sector generally possesses the combination of skills needed for assay development.33 But most academics have lacked systematic access to high-throughput screening and to the
small molecule libraries necessary for comprehensive target validation. Instead,
academics who desire access to small molecules in a pharmaceutical firm’s library must negotiate terms of access and the corresponding intellectual property
considerations on an ad hoc basis. Knowledgeable observers have long suggested
that the transaction costs associated with these individualized negotiations constitute a significant barrier.34
tors. See Henry Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 439 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Arthur Klausner, Mind the (Biomedical Funding) Gap, 23 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1217 (2005) (tracking the history of funding for research, and noting the reluctance of venture capital firms to fund upstream biomedical ventures).
31
One of the authors of this Article previously made some optimistic predictions in this regard. Arti
K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives,
Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173.
32. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (discussing
problems of uncertainty, indivisibility, and lack of appropriability involved in the production of
information).
33. See Adrian J. Ivinson, Letter to the Editor, University Investment in Drug Discovery, 310
SCIENCE 777 (2005) (contending that academics have been underutilized in drug research and discovery).
34. See Lipinski, supra note 9, at 382 (discussing individualized negotiations between principal
investigators and pharmaceutical firms).
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A recent survey of 414 academic scientists by John Walsh, Charlene Cho,
and Wesley Cohen provides some evidence of the magnitude of these costs. In
general, academic scientists report that negotiations between industry and academia concerning materials are likely to take longer, and cause more delay, than
negotiations within academia: thirty-five percent of such negotiations require
more than a month (as contrasted with twenty-one percent of negotiations with
university suppliers) and sixteen percent of such negotiations result in a research
delay of over one month (as contrasted with six percent of academic negotiations).35 Where the material in question is a drug, the transaction becomes particularly arduous. All other factors being equal, an academic’s request for a drug
(whether from industry or from another academic) was one-twelfth as likely to be
fulfilled as requests for other materials.36
Strains in academic-industry negotiations concerning drug-related materials
should come as no surprise. Such negotiations would typically become an option
only in cases where the firm’s research on a drug compound had progressed to
the point of disclosure through publication (and associated patenting).37 Disclosure would serve to alert the academic researcher that a firm had discovered a
promising compound. At that stage, much would be known about the drug compound, which would make the resulting transactions of relatively high value. The
firm would probably demand significant compensation for transferring the drug.
In fact, empirical data indicates that seventy percent of agreements involving the
transfer of drugs to academics include reach-through rights on improvements.38
At some point, industry requests for reach-through rights in patented drugs
may become routine. As matters currently stand, however, academics and university technology transfer officers remain uncertain about the appropriate use of
such rights,39 and their uncertainty can lead to impasse. The fact that seventy per35. John P. Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in
Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RESEARCH POLICY 1184, 1185-87 (2007).
36. Id. at 1190-91. When reporting this statistic, the authors do not control for whether the supplier is an academic or is in industry. Thus it is not possible to determine whether requests for drugs
were less likely to be fulfilled by industry suppliers than academic suppliers.
37. Cf. Lipinski, supra note 9, at 381 (discussing circumstances where a firm refers to a compound in a peer reviewed publication). In order to preserve commercial value, the firm would presumably allow publications about the compound only after a relevant patent application had been
filed.
38. Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1193. A reach-through royalty is an industry term that refers
to a royalty that extends beyond the licensed item to products made using the licensed item.
39. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al.
eds., 2001). It is also noteworthy that while academics often ignore patents on research materials
and make the materials in-house if they have the ability to do so, drug patents represent a prominent
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cent of agreements to transfer drugs to academics also include some restrictions
on publication40 no doubt exacerbates difficulties in negotiation.
Of course, information could flow in the opposite direction. Firms do monitor academic publications to determine whether researchers are working on
promising targets. In some cases they successfully form partnerships with the
academics in question.41 But surmounting difficulties in negotiation across the
academic-industry divide appears challenging in this context as well. In the survey by Walsh and his colleagues, academic respondents admitted to failing to
fulfill thirty-one percent of requests for materials from industry (as contrasted
with only six percent from other academics).42
B. Attempts To Bridge the Public-Private Divide
More standardized legal documentation is one obvious mechanism for reducing transaction costs in transfers of drug-related materials between the private
sector and academics. In general, standardized contracts can produce positive externalities that reduce transaction costs for users,43 and efforts in this direction
could be helpful. However, because the transactions in question are likely to be
of high value, full standardization will be difficult to achieve, or even affirmatively undesirable. Significant benefits may accrue from some level of customization. Moreover, the creation of standardized agreements represents a collective
action problem.44 Given the divergent perspectives of academia and the private
sector, solving this problem may not be straightforward.45
Even if standardized agreements were successfully created and impleexception. See Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1192. In the case of drugs, both lack of in-house expertise and patents represent barriers to use. Id.
40. Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1193.
41. Telephone Interview with Allen Roses, Senior Vice President of Pharmacogenetics,
GlaxoSmithKline, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Roses Interview]
(discussing partnerships that firms sometimes form upon reading of interesting work by academic
researchers).
42. Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1191.
43. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 720-30 (1997) (discussing
learning benefits conferred on later users and “network benefits” conferred on contemporaneous
users).
44. Id. at 736-40 (discussing “coordination” problems).
45. In some cases, implementation of standardized agreements can also represent a collective
action problem. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 306 (2003) (discussing failure of collective action
in university implementation of the standardized Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement).
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mented, the universe of transactions would be limited to those circumstances in
which significant work had already been carried out. Drug discovery might be
accelerated, but only to a limited extent. To put the point another way, the problem is only partly one of transaction costs in instances where transactions might
currently occur. More fundamentally, under the existing regime, insufficient
numbers of transactions—specifically, screens of potentially interesting assays
against large volumes of small molecules—occur in the first instance.
A more comprehensive response to the “valley of death” problem is the Molecular Libraries Initiative (MLI), undertaken by the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) several years ago.46 Although the purposes of the MLI go beyond target
validation, one key goal is to use public funding to advance research on targets to
a stage that would elicit industry interest. The MLI reflects NIH’s recognition of
three key technological changes: first, that recent research in genomics (e.g., the
Human Genome Project) has produced many new potential drug targets; second,
that enormous increases in high-throughput screening power make the screening
of hundreds of thousands of molecules a day possible for academic centers; and
third, that academic centers now have the capacity to efficiently synthesize large
numbers of chemical molecules.47
The MLI has created a “Molecular Libraries Small Molecule Repository” at
the San Francisco facilities of Discovery Partners International.48 It has been paying, and will continue to pay, academic researchers with expertise in medicinal
chemistry to generate molecules to populate this public domain repository.49 Currently, the repository contains about 100,000 small molecules (some of which
may duplicate molecules held in pharmaceutical firm libraries). This repository
consists of four molecular classes: “specialty sets,” including compounds with
known biological activity, such as drugs and toxins; natural products; “targeted
libraries” for specific, high-profile proteins; and diversity compounds.50 Ten academic centers have received funding to use this repository to perform high46. See generally Austin et al., supra note 8 (describing the background and goals of the MLI).
47. See Nat’l Insts. Health, Overview, Molecular Libraries and Imaging, http://nihroadmap.
nih.gov/molecularlibraries/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). In addition to the MLI, various individual
public institutions offer some HTS capability. For a list, see Solomon Nwaka & Alan Hudson, Innovative Lead Discovery Strategies for Tropical Diseases, 5 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 941,
947 (2006). However, the MLI is the most ambitious effort.
48. Molecular Libraries Initiative, General Information, http://mli.nih.gov/mlsmr/generalinformation (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
49. Id.
50. NIH Molecular Libraries, A Roadmap Initiative, MLSMR Project, http://mlsmr.glpg.com/
MLSMR_HomePage/identify.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). Targeted libraries include modulators of prominent protein families, such as proteases, kinases, ion channel proteins, and nuclear receptor sets. Diversity compounds include all other compounds. Id.
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throughput screening on assays submitted by the research community.51
The assays pertinent to this effort encompass more than simply proteins that
are potential drug targets.52 As NIH recognizes, small molecules available in the
public domain for all researchers are likely to be extremely valuable as research
tools that will further basic understanding of biological pathways not necessarily
related to direct drug development. Nevertheless, one of NIH’s goals is to encourage target validation, so as to narrow the gap between academic outputs and
commercial investment and produce more breakthrough drugs.53
In assessing the more directed goal of generating validated targets, it is important to recognize that the molecules in the public repository are likely to be of
lower quality (in terms of target specificity, metabolic attributes, toxicity and
other relevant features) than those held by pharmaceutical firms. Although academics and the public sector more generally are beginning to achieve some expertise in medicinal chemistry,54 they still do not possess the level of expertise
available in the pharmaceutical industry. This handicap may make the MLI target
validation goal harder to attain. More comprehensive validation may await confirmation by a private firm’s screening against a more “drug-like” molecule in its
own library.
One might argue that private firms should be willing to undertake this additional work. Under the default rules of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (which gave
universities broad discretion to secure patents on federally funded research),55 as
well as NIH rules specific to the MLI program,56 universities may patent targets
or associated assays. Thus, following the conventional vision of Bayh-Dole,57 a
51. Nat’l Insts. Health, New Paradigm Will Help Identify Leads for Drug Discovery,
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/july2006/nhgri-24.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
52. Other assays will include “protein-protein interactions, splicing events, and diverse cellular
and even organismal phenotypes.” Austin et al., supra note 8, at 1139.
53. Id. at 1138 (noting goal of target validation).
54. Thus, it appears that the NIH Chemical Genomics Center, which is part of the MLI, has
identified three classes of molecules that might be useful in treating Gaucher’s disease and is currently working on optimizing their activity and reducing toxicity. See Press Release, Nat’l Insts.
Health, Novel Approach Targets an Inherited Disorder: NIH Chemical Genomics Center Jumpstarts
Drug Development in Public Sector (July 23, 2007), available at http://www.genome.gov/2552214.
In addition, according to Center director Chris Austin, the Center’s specific use of quantitative
high-throughput screening techniques, which allows chemical compounds to be tested at different
concentrations, is likely to reduce false positives and false negatives. Id.
55. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
56. See NIH MLSCN Project Team Position on Data Sharing and IP in the MLSCN Program
(Oct. 15, 2005) (on file with authors).
57. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
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private firm might hedge the risk involved in this additional work by obtaining an
exclusive license to the patented target or assay. However, given venture capitalists’ current reluctance to invest in relatively early-stage patents,58 these exclusive licenses may not suffice.
In any event, experimentation with another alternative—direct screening of
academic assays against a pool of the small molecule libraries held by pharmaceutical firms—would eliminate some unnecessary intermediate work and could
also reduce the transaction costs associated with licensing targets. To the extent
that such a pool encompassed distinct contributions from several firms,59 it might
contain considerably more molecules than the current group of 100,000 held in
the public-domain repository.
In sum, the impasse in genomic science presents the following underlying
characteristics. First, too few qualified researchers are able to use screening assays against the small molecule libraries held as trade secrets by discoveryoriented pharmaceutical firms.60 In particular, academic scientists with the talent
to design assays lack access to these libraries. Second, to the extent that the libraries held by individual, discovery-oriented pharmaceutical firms differ from
each other, it would be advantageous for academics to conduct screening assays
against a pool that contains portions of all the libraries held by discoveryoriented firms.61
If such a pool were created, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical firms would
contribute molecules about which they already possessed significant information
(let alone molecules they considered potential lead compounds). Even so, a pool
that included some substantial subset of pharmaceutical firms’ compounds—for
example, “diversity” compounds about which little was known—could prove extremely useful.
II. MODELS FOR MULTI-FIRM, PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION
As a supplement to current approaches such as the MLI and to possible fuTechnology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1698-99 (1996)
(discussing motivations behind the Bayh-Dole Act); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research,
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 95-97 (1999).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 30.
59. For a discussion of questions regarding overlap in molecular library contents, see infra Section III.A.
60. Our research suggests that pharmaceutical firms may conduct fewer than one hundred
screens per year against their whole library. See Roses Interview, supra note 41.
61. Molecule libraries held by firms that do not seek to discover new targets would be much
less useful, as those libraries would primarily contain molecules that work against existing, already
validated targets.
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ture efforts, including standardized contracts, we suggest a novel, large-scale
public-private model. This collaborative approach would draw upon some recent
experimentation that pharmaceutical firms are already conducting in this area.
Moreover, it would respond to the advice that analysts have been giving the
pharmaceutical industry for years—that it must “fundamentally review [its] R&D
business models.”62 In this Part, we describe inter-firm, public-private collaborations in the areas of safety and efficacy upon which our proposed approach
would draw. Part III describes our proposed collaboration in detail.
A. Existing Collaborations on Toxicity and Efficacy
Until recently, pharmaceutical companies paid insufficient attention to optimizing particular characteristics of small molecules, such as toxicity and “pharmacokinetics” (i.e., absorption, diffusion, metabolism, and excretion), which are
important for drug safety and efficacy in the human body.63 For example, firms
sometimes designated a “lead” compound, and assembled a full team around it,
solely because the compound had shown significant activity (affinity and selectivity) in a high-throughput laboratory screen against an assay containing a target
protein.64 Thus, firms were making a substantial investment without any good information about how the body would respond to the potential drug. In recent
years, analysts have recognized that the lack of early attention to pharmacokinetic and toxicity-related characteristics of proposed small molecules was a factor in the growing number of pipeline failures, including costly failures at late
stages of clinical testing or even after FDA approval for commercial marketing.65
Pharmaceutical firms have worked diligently to address this problem. As an
initial matter, they purged their libraries of molecules that are likely to be
“grit”—for example, molecules that are non-selective inhibitors of many different targets or that have well-known pharmacokinetic or toxicological liabilities.66
Firms are also enhancing the quality of their libraries with the help of specialized
suppliers of small molecules. Moreover, prior to selecting lead compounds for
62. DataMonitor, supra note 10.
63. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 87 (finding that failure rates in human clinical trials
based on lack of safety or efficacy were eighty-two percent in the 1996-99 period and ninety-one
percent in the 2000-03 period).
64. Bleicher et al, supra note 19, at 370 (“It was not uncommon for a single [hit] compound to
be considered a ‘lead’ structure.”).
65. Id.
66. Telephone Interview with Allen Roses, Senior Vice President of Pharmacogenetics,
GlaxoSmithKline, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (Dec. 19, 2006) (on file with authors). See also
Lipinski, supra note 9, at 381 (discussing the use of the Lipinski “rule of 5” to filter out compounds
that are unlikely to be absorbed orally).
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optimization, pharmaceutical firms have been supplementing high-throughput
screening with another stage of focused inquiry into properties necessary for
safety and efficacy in the human body.67

The pharmaceutical industry is also advancing safety and efficacy
goals by means of public-private collaborative partnerships. Specifically,
in establishing at least two such consortia, firms have recognized that an
optimal level of inquiry into safety or efficacy may require knowledge not
contained within the boundaries of a single firm. To the extent that any
participating pharmaceutical firm finds standard, early biological signs
(also known as biomarkers) of drug toxicity or efficacy, all the other firms
in the consortium could use this information for a variety of efficiencyenhancing functions.
For example, biomarkers might help to provide expedited preclinical
drug safety evaluation as well as early indicators of clinical safety and efficacy.68 They could also be used to troubleshoot compounds that fail preclinical drug safety testing.69 Whenever the Food and Drug Administration
approved a particular biomarker as a reliable indicator of safety or efficacy
for a variety of drugs, it might become an industry standard around which
all competing firms could converge. As the National Academy of Sciences
noted in a recent report endorsing horizontal biomarker consortia, these
“precompetitive projects (most likely unrelated to a particular drug) would
be enabling to the field.”70
In one recently formed collaboration, the Predictive Safety Testing
Consortium (PSTC), all of the major pharmaceutical firms have committed to sharing internally-developed laboratory methods that predict the
safety of new treatments.71 They have also committed to performing validation experiments on laboratory methods developed by other consortium

67. See Andrew L. Hopkins, Michael J. Witty & Solomon Nwaka, Mission Possible, 449
NATURE 166, 168 fig. (2007) (discussing steps such as cell-based or animal model testing).
68. See, e.g., Toxicogenomic Cross-Validation Consortium Agreement § 2.1 (Jan. 20, 2006)
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Consortium Agreement] (discussing the use of “safety biomarkers” for expediting preclinical and clinical drug development).
69. See id. § 2.1(c) (discussing such troubleshooting).
70. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., CANCER BIOMARKERS: THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES OF
IMPROVING DETECTION AND TREATMENT 6 (2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/
11892.html.
71. Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.2 (stating that members “must be willing and
able to contribute one or more nominated exploratory Safety Biomarkers or other information or
Materials for use in Consortium research activities”). Note that the Predictive Safety Testing Consortium was formerly known as the Toxicogenomic Cross-Validation Consortium.
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members.72 As a result, under the PSTC, experts from multiple firms work
on sequential phases of the same project to develop tests of drug safety.
The PSTC agreement relies heavily on a non-profit, trusted intermediary, Critical Path, of which the FDA is a founding member. Critical Path is
responsible for consortium management. For example, it collects membership fees from pharmaceutical firm participants, coordinates the selection
of research projects, and (with the assistance of an advisory committee
composed of Critical Path and pharmaceutical firm representatives) manages the flow of any confidential information.73 If the PSTC advisory
committee deems it appropriate to seek patents on technology generated
by the consortium, Critical Path will own the patent rights.74
While the PSTC focuses on tests for safety, the recently-formed Biomarkers Consortium aims to encompass research that identifies good biomarkers of both drug safety and efficacy.75 Like the PSTC, the Biomarkers
Consortium includes all of the major pharmaceutical firms, and it allows
scientists at competing firms to contribute their expertise to the development of specific biomarkers. As with the PSTC, public sector agencies—
most prominently the non-profit Foundation for the NIH, which manages
public-private partnerships for NIH—play a major role in selecting research projects and in managing the flow of funding.76
72. See id. (stating that members must “perform validation work with respect to one or more
Safety Biomarkers . . . and have the capability to cross-validate Safety Biomarkers”).
73. See id. §§ 5.2, 6.1 (discussing various aspects of Critical Path’s management role).
74. See id. § 8.2(a) (noting the role of the advisory committee in determining whether to pursue
formal patent rights); id. § 8.2(b) (stating that “[e]ach Member performing any activities under a
Research Project hereby assigns to C-Path all of such Member’s right, title, and interest in and to
any and all Consortium Technology”). The PSTC recently submitted twenty-three proposed biomarkers that could be used to identify kidney toxicity in preclinical animal testing. See Bernadette
Toner, Predictive Safety Testing Consortium Submits First Biomarkers to FDA for Qualification,
GENOME WEB DAILY NEWS, June 21, 2007, http://www.genomeweb.com/issues/news/1407031.htm. It is unclear whether any patent rights have been sought.
75. Press Release, Foundation for the NIH, Public-Private Partnership Forms the Biomarkers
Consortium To Advance the Science of Personalized Medicine (Oct. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.fnih.org/news/TBC_Press_Release.shtml (noting that “the FDA can use biomarkers to
determine whether drugs can safely and effectively treat disease”). The Biomarkers Consortium
also plans to identify biomarkers for early disease detection. See id. That research goal is not directly relevant here.
76. See FOUND. FOR THE NIH, THE BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, TWO-PHASED PROJECT
APPROVAL PROCESS: CONCEPT CLEARANCE AND PROJECT PLAN APPROVAL 3 (2006), available at
http://test.fnih.org/Biomarkers%20Consortium/Project_Clearance.pdf (showing a flowchart that
details responsibilities of the FNIH Board). While the PSTC funds its research projects from membership fees, the Biomarkers Consortium agreement requires the Foundation for the NIH to seek
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Research on biomarkers will ultimately yield products, such as safety
assays, that are beneficial to multiple pharmaceutical firms, but are
unlikely to represent a core product for any firm. For this and other reasons, both of these consortia require ex ante commitments to relatively
liberal licensing agreements for any intellectual property their common efforts may generate.
In the case of the PSTC, members agree that the objective of the consortium is to achieve “broad public dissemination of the results of the research and development projects conducted pursuant to this Agreement.”77
Patents are to be sought only in cases where the advisory committee determines that they would promote dissemination of discoveries.78 Moreover, Critical Path is obligated to license any patents it may own to all
comers on commercially reasonable terms.79
In contrast with the PSTC, the Biomarkers Consortium does not assign intellectual property rights to a trusted intermediary. Rather, inventorship is governed by the default rules of U.S. law, and ownership is defined
by the policies of the inventor’s employer.80 Nonetheless, for all new data
and inventions arising out of a particular project, all participants that have
an ownership interest in the intellectual property generated must grant to
all other participants a “non-exclusive, remuneration-free license.”81
B. Expanding the Collaborative Approach
The formation of collaborative horizontal partnerships to address safety and
efficacy raises the question of whether other, somewhat analogous, but more ambitious forms of collaboration could successfully address problems of translation.
Specifically, we ask whether large-scale collaboration might improve translation
by the academic sector of large volumes of upstream biological information into
“validated targets” and potential drug candidates that would be of interest to industry. Like safety and efficacy, translation arguably entails further improvement
of relatively undifferentiated trade secret information held by multiple firms.
This improvement process may be greatly enhanced through evaluation by multiple parties.
specific funding for each new project. Id.
77. Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, § 8.2(a).
78. See id.
79. Id. § 8.3(b).
80. FOUND. FOR THE NIH, THE BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, GENERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND DATA SHARING PRINCIPLES 5 (2006), available at http://test.fnih.org/Biomarkers%
20Consortium/IP_Policies.pdf.
81. Id.
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Like the PSTC and the Biomarkers Consortium, our proposed partnership
would use a trusted intermediary to facilitate firm participation. Additionally, like
the Biomarkers Consortium, it could use the lure of public funding to stimulate
greater participation by the private sector. Unlike these other consortia, however,
our partnership would produce outputs—potential drug candidates—that engender fierce inter-firm competition. Thus, while the PSTC does not link inventive
contribution and ownership, our proposal would maintain a tight link between the
two. Additionally, whereas the PSTC and the Biomarkers Consortium mandate
relatively liberal licensing practices, our proposal would have no such mandate.
In our proposed partnership, the trusted intermediary would necessarily play
a more vigorous role in handling confidential information. As discussed further
in Part III, the intermediary would itself conduct the high-throughput screening
of the pharmaceutical firms’ molecules against assays contributed by academics.
It would thus be the only party to the collaboration that possessed full knowledge
of all of the assays and molecules that academics and pharmaceutical firms, respectively, had contributed.
By merging academic talent in assay design with the high-quality but underutilized research resource represented by the pharmaceutical firms’ libraries,
our proposed public-private partnership aims to help the parties traverse the valley of death that currently impedes research on drugs that address new targets. As
contrasted with the alternative of complete vertical integration—for example,
subsidizing discovery-oriented pharmaceutical firms to hire academics with assay
design skills—the public-private partnership we envision would allow assay designers access not simply to one firm’s library but instead to a larger, pooled library consisting of small molecule collections that a number of firms had contributed. Unlike complete vertical integration, a public-private collaboration
would not require academics to change career paths, which would make it more
likely to succeed. Pharmaceutical companies contributing portions of their libraries might still be subsidized to the extent that the trusted intermediary consented,
at least initially, to bear some of the costs associated with establishing the pool
and of providing academic researchers relevant grants.
Pharmaceutical firms that contributed compounds to the pool would profit
directly from any commercial drug that emerged from molecules they contributed. As we discuss in Part III, ordinary patent rules would deliver this result.
Additionally, participating firms might find it in their interest to allow those who
contributed molecules to the pool to receive a small share of the patentee’s profits when one or more of their molecules fell within a subset of initially promising
molecules identified by the screening process. In the latter instance, profit would
be derived from a predetermined royalty stream to the contributing firms under
an automatic license, as discussed in Section III.B below.
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III. THE PROPOSED MULTI-FIRM PARTNERSHIP
In this Part, we outline the institutional framework and intellectual property
strategies that could help stakeholders in both the private and public sectors to
make better and more productive use of the aggregate stock of small molecules
available for high-throughput screening. These proposals attempt to bridge the
gap between patents and the public domain, which is currently regulated only by
the application of trade secret law (or actual secrecy), to the private sector’s large
hoards of small molecules.
The ultimate objectives of our approach are to:
1) Create a research regime in which qualified public-sector participants
explore a larger and higher quality pool of molecules than is currently
possible.
2) Design a contractually-constructed framework in which publicly
funded university research could identify potential lead compounds
without compromising patents on those compounds.
3) Administer this voluntarily-adopted framework within a publicprivate partnership that would more effectively translate upstream research into truly innovative therapeutic advances, thereby contributing
to overall public health.
A. The Threshold Question of Overlap
An initial question regarding pool formation concerns possible overlap
among molecules that participating firms may contribute. If, for example, it
turned out that molecules contributed by different firms were substantially identical, then there would be little reason to pool the molecules. In that case, a model
of multiple public-private partnerships, each built around contracts with a single
firm, would become preferable. This alternative model is discussed in Section
III.F below.
Because libraries are held by firms as trade secrets, the amount of overlap
among them is currently unknown. More important for present purposes, it is unclear whether the molecules actually selected and contributed by participating
firms would overlap. Even if we postulate that most firms would contribute socalled “diversity” molecules (because these were the molecules about which they
had little specific information), the extent of overlap between the various firms’
diversity molecules remains unknown. A trusted intermediary accordingly would
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need access to structural data on a confidential basis in order to determine the degree of overlap. It could then release this information (in suitably anonymized
fashion) to participating firms.
For example, in a situation where three firms had contributed molecular libraries, the intermediary might reveal that, of the total number of molecules contributed, about twenty percent were duplicates owned by two firms and ten percent by three firms. At that point, the participating firms would determine
whether the degree of overlap was sufficiently small to justify going forward. If
the firms decided to proceed, the pooled molecules would already have been collated and any instances of duplication identified. This collation would, in turn,
eliminate duplicative screening.
B. A Two-Tiered Regime
Central to our proposed multi-firm partnership is a two-tiered system. At
Tier 1, both academic external researchers and the participating companies could
be viewed as operating behind a “veil of ignorance.”82 Although the researcher
might possess some information about a potentially interesting assay, and the
participating companies might hold some basic information about the molecules
they contributed, information on both sides would be relatively inchoate and precompetitive in nature.
Equally important, only the trusted intermediary would know about the full
set of assays and molecules existing at Tier 1. Individual academic researchers
and contributing firms would remain unaware of contributions by any other parties. In contrast, research activities conducted at Tier 2, under the custom-made
contractual arrangements described below, would necessarily have moved beyond this veil of ignorance.
The trusted intermediary would host the pool and assume responsibilities for
its day-to-day management and administration. The intermediary would also certify and perhaps fund the public-sector academics allowed to explore the molecules held in the pool. Additional financial guarantees from participating universities might become necessary in order to assure pharmaceutical firms that
contractual obligations regarding nondisclosure were respected.
1. Tier 1: Behind the Veil of Ignorance
At the first tier of the partnership, researchers in approved academic institutions (that is, institutions that had signed nondisclosure agreements and perhaps
put up a bond to guard against misappropriation) would contribute assays. The
trusted intermediary would then run these assays against the pooled collection of
82. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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small molecules made available by participating firms. All molecules contributed
to the pool would be tagged with a marker that tracked their corporate origin. The
trusted intermediary would, however, code these markers so that researchers receiving information on “hits” resulting from high-throughput screening would
not know the pharmaceutical firm owner of the molecules they were using.
Successful high-throughput screening of these molecules would likely identify a subset of molecules as “hits”—in other words, molecules that showed significant activity against the target in question and could lead to new drug candidates. The academic who contributed the assay would receive coded results
showing levels of activity for the relevant molecules, and the firms would receive
some information as well. This Tier 1 information would be released in a structured way, in order to best facilitate the formation of an academic-pharmaceutical
partnership for further target validation and drug development.
Prior to being told that one or more of the molecules it had contributed represented a hit, the firm could withdraw a molecule at any point. In order to forestall opportunistic behavior, however, once the trusted intermediary informed the
firm that one of its molecules represented a hit, that molecule could not be withdrawn. On the contrary, after a hit, the contributing firm would have an obligation to provide relevant structural information to the academic via the intermediary.83 Standardized licenses governing first-tier access would forbid information
disclosure or misappropriation.
For its part, the academic laboratory and associated university (communicating through the intermediary) would provide the firms that owned hit molecules
with a general statement of the methodology used to develop its target. However,
in order to maintain its bargaining position despite the absence of a patent,84 the
academic institution would not identify that target.85 Therefore, at this point, the
academic scientist would know the chemical structure of a number of compounds
that showed activity against the target, while the pharmaceutical firm(s) would
know that one or more molecules from their libraries had presented interesting
research possibilities.
The public-sector scientist, with the assistance of the trusted intermediary,
would attempt to determine which firm had the combination of hit molecules
83. For purposes of collation and determining overlap, the firm would already have provided
this structural information to the intermediary. As discussed further in the illustrative example below, see infra Section III.E, structural information is probably the primary information the firm
would have. In particular, firms would be unlikely to contribute to the pool molecules about which
they had significant positive information.
84. University participants in the partnership would be barred from seeking patents on assays
or targets prior to participation in the screening program. See infra Section IV.B.
85. For further discussion of the university perspective, as well as the perspectives of other
stakeholders, see infra Part IV.
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most likely to yield a successful drug. The decision would presumably be based
on an assessment of liabilities and assets associated with the structures in question. Through the trusted intermediary, a firm could also, if it so desired, share
with the scientist on a confidential basis any additional information that it might
have. Presumably, it would do so in order to entice the scientist into a second-tier
partnership.
A complication in the process would arise if one or more of the chosen
firm’s hit molecules were duplicates of molecules owned by another firm. In all
likelihood, co-ownership of even one molecule should remain a relatively rare
occurrence because, as discussed earlier, if molecules contributed by different
firms overlapped significantly, there would be little reason to move forward with
a multi-firm pool.
In the event of co-ownership, there are several options worth considering,
and one to be avoided. The latter is the default route of future patent coownership (e.g., co-ownership of a patent on a potential lead compound that
emerged from the co-owned molecule). Patent law encourages strategic behavior
on the part of co-owners by allowing each one to “make, use, offer to sell, or sell
the patented invention . . . without the consent of and without accounting to the
other owners.”86 Although this default approach has the virtue of facilitating licensing (because the consent of only one co-owner is needed), it also means that
disagreement between co-owners undermines the existence of an effective patent
monopoly. Under our current system of R&D financing, monopoly rights on
drugs are critical for hedging the risk associated with the long and complex preclinical and clinical development process.87
The simplest solution would allow the researcher to continue with the firm
he or she had chosen, notwithstanding co-ownership of one or more hits. This option would be particularly useful if (as seems likely, given that the threshold inquiry would presumably have found relatively little overlap in contributions)
only one or two molecules out of the chosen firm’s set of hits were co-owned.
The co-owner might then be entitled to royalty-based compensation if the molecule in question led to a marketable drug, but it would have avoided the cost and
risk of follow-on work.
86. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000). See generally Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, CoOwnership of Patents: A Comparative and Economics View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
586 (1990) (discussing possibilities for opportunistic behavior created by the law of co-ownership).
87. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552; cf. Tracy R.
Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman & Anthony D. So, The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight
of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Jan. 2007, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss1/art3/ (arguing that clinical trials should be treated as a public good).
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In the rare case where all (or most) of the relevant molecules were coowned, the co-owning firms could set up a separate joint venture that would hold
future patent rights. In order to avoid antitrust concerns in cases where the joint
venture occupied a large share of the relevant research space, one of the firms
could remain a silent partner that simply held a pre-determined equity stake in
the joint venture. Importantly, the initial framework agreement would specify the
alternatives available in situations of dual ownership so as to rule out the possibility of co-ownership of patents.
As noted earlier,88 it appears that some pharmaceutical firms have already
formed public-private partnerships with academic researchers whose published
work indicates that they are working on interesting targets. They have done so,
however, on a limited, ad hoc basis. Our first tier public-private partnership
would provide a standardized platform for the systematic formation of many
more second tier relationships than currently exist. Not only would the basis for
forming such relationships be put in place, but with routine access to a pool of
high-quality small molecule libraries guaranteed, one would also expect the public sector to develop many more validated targets that would be of interest to
pharmaceutical companies.
Essentially, firms would be outsourcing assay development and target validation to individual academics who are well placed to do this work, but who
would otherwise be difficult to integrate into the firm vertically as employees.89
As contrasted with vertical integration, a public-private partnership would allow
assay developers to run their assays against a broad array of molecules held by
multiple firms.
2. Tier 2: Beyond the Veil of Ignorance
Once the academic had chosen a prospective partner, second-tier negotiations would commence. Because the terms of such second-tier partnerships are
likely to vary quite substantially depending on the type of target at issue, we do
not propose standard-form agreements for this tier. Presumably, the negotiated
contract enabling Tier 2 research would further specify the expected relations of
the parties during the drug development phase, and the distribution of expected
royalties from patented lead compounds. Assuming the drug development process proved successful, and the patented drug passed clinical trials and entered the
stream of commerce, the patent owner (i.e., the pharmaceutical firm) would ob88. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
89. Cf. Bernard Munos, Can Open-Source R&D Reinvigorate Drug Research?, 5 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 723, 723 (2006) (discussing the outsourcing of drug research-related laboratory and clinical studies “to institutions with the requisite capacity through the help of matchmaking software”).
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tain patent rents exactly as occurs at present.
A possible complication could arise, however, if the scientist and the pharmaceutical firm could not successfully conclude a second-tier agreement. In that
case, we would propose that the scientist retain the opportunity to negotiate with
the owners of other molecules that had represented hits at Tier 1. The information
obtained by the academic in the negotiations with the first firm would, of course,
remain subject to confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements.
If a Tier 2 partnership was formed and subsequently dissolved, the magnitude of potential inter-firm information leakage could become sufficiently great
as to rule out allowing the scientist to negotiate with other firms. In any event,
the framework agreement for the partnership would have to provide for both of
these contingencies.
An important question to be addressed in the Tier 2 agreement would concern the timing of any eventual publication by the academic. Although we do not
propose standard form agreements at Tier 2, the framework agreement should ensure that the academic can publish his or her findings as soon as appropriate arrangements for patentability had been made. This would represent an improvement over the current situation, where the available empirical evidence indicates
that corporate sponsors sometimes require academics to withhold data well beyond the time necessary to file a patent.90
C. The Option of a Contractually-Constructed Liability Regime91
In addition to the structure outlined above, participating firms might also
agree on a supplementary system of royalties that would govern compensation to
any firm that had provided structural information about its molecules to a researcher deciding among promising “hits.” In other words, firms would be contracting into a subsidiary set of “take and pay rules,” or liability rules, rather than
92
relying entirely on exclusive property rights. As a historical matter, liability
rules have always modulated between exclusive property rights, on the one hand,
90. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry Study, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 371 (1996) (finding that
fifty-six percent of corporate sponsors report that research results are sometimes kept confidential
longer than the time required to file a patent).
91. The term “contractually-constructed liability regime” is drawn from J.H. Reichman & Paul
F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003).
92. The classic reference is, of course, Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see
also Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
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93

and the public domain, on the other. In modern times, codified liability regimes
that provide ex ante entitlements to compensation for certain uses (but not necessarily a right to exclude others from use) have been adopted in some intellectual
94
95
property systems, and in at least one international treaty.
One feature of liability rules is that, even in the absence of legislative fiat,
they may be voluntarily adopted whenever stakeholders seek to obtain a private
ordering with outcomes that differ from what the default rules of intellectual
96
property law might otherwise provide. For example, various commentators
have discussed patent pools as an example of contractually-constructed liability
97
rules. Similarly, contractually-constructed liability rules are sometimes used by
patent holders as a mechanism for generating revenue from background property
rights. (Indeed, proponents of the “one monopoly profit” thesis would argue that
patent holders should generally be indifferent between using liability rules and
98
exploiting their monopoly exclusively.) When Stanford University famously
93. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks Concerning
the Systemic Problems Affecting Developed Intellectual Property Regimes, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
94. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 504-20 (1995) (stressing the need for a new intellectual property
paradigm based on liability rules for cumulative and sequential innovation); J.H. Reichman, Legal
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2477 (1994) (discussing an Italian regime protecting construction designs and technical drawings); id. at 2480 (discussing the British Design Law of 1988, since repealed by the E.U. Design Regulation); see also
Merges, supra note 92, at 1308-09 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 115, a liability regime for sound recordings of copyrighted musical works).
95. F.A.O. Res 3/2001, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001, http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/itpgr.htm (imposing a compensatory liability regime on those who make commercial applications derived from public-domain seeds).
96. See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000); see also Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis,
Using Liability Rules To Stimulate Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional
Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds.,
2005).
97. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 92, at 1340-52. As Merges discusses, the typical patent pool
involves multiple firms agreeing voluntarily to refrain from exercising their rights to exclude. Instead of asserting patent rights, firms contribute the rights to a package license that is available on
reasonable terms either to participants in the pool or to all comers. Id. In recent years, the pooling
of patents around information technology industry standards has become quite common. See, e.g.,
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
98. For an excellent discussion of the implications of the “one monopoly profit” thesis for plat-
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made its Cohen-Boyer patent on DNA manipulation techniques available to all
users willing to pay specified royalties under a non-exclusive license, it voluntar99
ily converted the exclusive rights conferred by its patent to a liability regime.
100
As discussed further below, we believe the possibility of a liability rule
payment could induce greater participation by pharmaceutical firms. This compensatory liability payment (say, on the order of three to five percent) would become available to firms if any of their molecules fell within the class of promising “hits” at the initial stage of high-throughput screening. Firms would
accordingly benefit from income streams not only in circumstances where they
actually undertook the expensive and risky follow-on work that led to a patented
marketable drug, but also if they contributed a small amount (in the form of
structural information on a hit) to upstream work. In this manner, firms could, to
some extent, mitigate the overall risks of drug development.101
The framework agreement for our proposed partnership would spell out any
ex ante liability rule entitlements that the participating firms had agreed to adopt.
The intermediary would also collect and share data concerning the impact of the
liability regime as a cost-sharing and risk-reducing technique over time. However, in the event that such obligations triggered antitrust difficulties or deterred
participation (perhaps because firms doing the follow-on work resisted the liability rule as an unacceptable “reach-through royalty”),102 they remain an optional
feature of our proposal.
D. Adding New Participants
The public-private partnership we propose would be most likely to succeed
if the founding members were firms with robust libraries that continued to be active in the search for new targets. At the same time, it would be inopportune,
counterproductive, and possibly illegal as a matter of antitrust law to foreclose
the possibility that other firms might join the pool. The pool members would thus
be well-advised to organize from the outset the conditions of future membership.
Because of the manner in which the pool would be structured—specifically,
form technologies, and of situations where the thesis might not apply, see Joseph Farrell & Philip
Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergency of
Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 104, 105-19 (2003).
99. For a discussion of the Cohen-Boyer licensing strategy, see Rai & Eisenberg, supra note
45, at 300.
100. See infra Section IV.A.
101. We also believe that the innovation-related benefits of a liability rule scheme (in terms of
inducing participation in the pool) are sufficiently large that a small royalty paid to competitors
should not be deemed to violate antitrust law. See infra Section IV.D.
102. See supra note 38.
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the fact that private-firm researchers would not have any access to the small
molecule pool and that even access by academic researchers at Tier 1 would be
restricted to information about potentially promising “hits”—adding additional
members should be relatively straightforward. New members and their contributions would be protected by the same nondisclosure agreements as pre-existing
members. Similarly, hit molecules contributed by new members would be treated
in the same manner as hit molecules contributed by founding members.
Notably, existing consortia, such as the PSTC, explicitly provide for the addition of new members. Under the PSTC framework agreement, new members
that can contribute to biomarker validation and pay membership fees are allowed
into the consortium as a matter of course.103
E. An Illustrative Example
Consider the following stylized example of the manner in which our proposed public-private partnership would work.104 Many researchers believe that
Alzheimer’s disease is caused by the accumulation of short protein fragments
that are formed when certain precursor proteins (known as amyloid precursor
proteins) break down.105 An Alzheimer’s researcher (Researcher A) in University
B determines that a previously unknown protein (protein C) appears to be centrally involved in the breakdown of amyloid precursor proteins. She creates an
assay designed to test whether a small molecule binds to protein C (“protein C
binding assay”).
Researcher A (and her employer, University B) have previously complied
with all the requirements for participation in the screening pool. She and her university have signed the relevant nondisclosure agreements and have posted the
bond necessary to reinforce the pertinent nondisclosure rules. Thus, she is eligible to submit her assay to the trusted intermediary who will screen it against the
aggregate collection of molecules that Companies 1, 2, and 3 have contributed to
the pool.
The trusted intermediary will have previously compared the structure of the
molecules submitted by these companies and presumably found only a small
amount of overlap (e.g., only ten percent of molecules were owned by two firms
and one percent were owned by three firms). Based on this small amount of overlap, the companies had decided to go forward with the pool.
103. Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.3.
104. Note that although the facts in this example are generally based on accurate scientific information, they are intended for illustrative purposes only.
105. See, e.g.,Vincent T. Marchesi, An Alternative Interpretation of the Amyloid $E Hypothesis
with Regard to the Pathogenesis of Alzheimer's Disease, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9093, 9093
(2005).
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The trusted intermediary proceeds to screen the combined molecule libraries
of all three companies against the protein C binding assay. The intermediary then
gives the results, which include the raw data generated in the experiment, to Researcher A. In consultation with the trusted intermediary, Researcher A determines that there is a group of seven molecules that show significant activity and
might lead to promising new drugs. The trusted intermediary informs A that
these molecules are owned by Companies 1 and 3—Company 1 owns three of
the molecules, and Company 3 owns the other four.
At this point, the trusted intermediary also informs Companies 1 and 3 that
they have molecules that represent hits, but the companies do not learn that they
are hits on protein C specifically. Companies 1 and 3 can no longer withdraw the
relevant molecules from the pool, and they must provide Researcher A with information about the structures of the hit molecules. Researcher A and the trusted
intermediary analyze the structures they have been given and the results of the
assay, and on that basis decide that Researcher A and University B should attempt to negotiate a Tier 2 agreement with Company 3. If an agreement is
reached with Company 3, and subsequently results in a new drug, Company 1
may be entitled to a three to five percent royalty as provided for in the framework
agreement. If the negotiations with Company 3 fail, Researcher A and University
B have the option of negotiating with Company 1.
In the more complex case where one or a few of the molecules in Company
3’s set of hits is also owned by another company (say Company 2), the decisionmaking process would be governed by the rules upon which the stakeholders had
previously agreed. For example, the framework agreement might provide that in
most cases, Researcher A could simply continue working with Company 3, while
Company 2 might become entitled to some predetermined compensation but
would not participate in, or bear any risk associated with, downstream research.
In the rare case that the relevant molecules were all co-owned, the framework
agreement might enable Companies 2 and 3 to form a joint venture that owned
any resulting patent rights.106
If this and similar ventures were to succeed, the framework agreement would
have maximized opportunities to generate new drugs by multiplying the number
of assays that were screened against an expanded chemical space. In this manner,
our model would enable complex and risky research that might not otherwise
have occurred under existing arrangements. More importantly, it could enable
and greatly increase the likelihood of breakthrough therapeutic results on significant diseases.
106. The possibility of using joint ventures in downstream work on a set of promising molecules
drawn from different sources would depend on the attitude of the relevant antitrust authorities. We
discuss the antitrust implications of these options below. See infra Section IV.D.
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F. Single Firm Public-Private Partnerships
As previously observed, even if the trusted intermediary determined that the
molecules that firms had contributed overlapped substantially, it would still be in
the firms’ interest to undertake some sort of collaborative approach. In that case,
however, a better approach might rely on one or more single firm public-private
partnerships. A single-firm partnership would give academic researchers the opportunity to screen their assays against that portion of the firm’s library that the
firm chose to make available.
Single firm public-private partnerships would not require the level of organizational infrastructure required by a broader pooling approach. A willing firm
might simply invite interested academic researchers to submit assays, which it
would then screen in-house against some subset of compounds within its proprietary library. However, a trusted intermediary might remain useful in this context,
especially if it could assist the firms in identifying potential academic research
participants and their associated institutions.
For example, in the context of tropical diseases targets, it appears that the
World Health Organization’s (WHO) Tropical Disease Network has organized a
consortium of researchers who are interested in screening their targets against
pharmaceutical firm libraries. Three firms—Pfizer, Merck Serono, and Chemtura—are now allowing this “TDR Compound Evaluation Network” to submit
targets for in-house screening against a subset of the firms’ respective chemical
libraries.107 The trusted intermediary might also help to fund the academic scientists, guard against misappropriation of unpatented results by participants in the
partnership, and set the conditions of eventual publication of research results.
Because the “private” side of the partnership would, at any given time, be
limited to a single firm, there would be no need for a two-tiered regime. Rather,
qualified academics would simply submit assays to the firm in question. If and
when a particular screening assay yielded a group of hits, the academic and the
firm would then negotiate the terms of a public-private development partnership.
As with the multi-firm partnership, the private firm would be free to withdraw
molecules from the screening process up to the point when the molecule yielded
a hit.
In the event that screening against the library of a given firm yielded no interesting hits, the academic investigator might want to submit the assay to other
firms that had made a subset of their libraries available. However, because anonymity could not be preserved in a single-firm arrangement, “sequential” screening would depend on the first firm’s willingness to permit it.

107. Hopkins, Witty & Nwaka, supra note 67, at 169.
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IV. ANALYZING THE COLLABORATION: STAKEHOLDER INCENTIVES AND
TRADEOFFS
Having outlined the basic principles of our two-tiered proposal, we turn to a
detailed discussion of the incentives that would induce stakeholders to enter into
such an arrangement. We also briefly discuss salient antitrust issues pertinent to
our proposal.
A. The Firms’ Perspective
Pharmaceutical firms stand to gain a great deal, and lose little, through participation in our proposal. Current efforts to generate truly novel drugs are failing. Our proposal would leverage the expertise of publicly funded researchers in
a manner that redounds to the benefit of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole
while limiting aggregate costs and generating considerable efficiencies in the upstream research process.
Firms will be concerned about the risk that potentially important trade secret
information (specifically, molecular structure and the fact that a particular molecule shows activity against an assay) might leak over to competitors. For this reason, only academic researchers should be allowed access to such information.
Those researchers who identified a promising molecule would be deterred from
misappropriation not only by contractual obligations and required bonding, but
also by their need to partner with the firm contributing the most promising molecule in order to commercialize the research results.
By contrast, allowing private-sector researchers entry into the pool would
create undue risk of misappropriation and industrial espionage. Fear of such misappropriation might deter firms from entering the pool in the first instance. Alternatively, firms might be tempted to contribute only “bad” molecules. Indeed,
fear of misappropriation is so great that various efforts to foster even a limited
amount of inter-firm information exchange about molecular library contents in
the past have foundered on the inability of firms to sufficiently disguise or
“mask” information about molecular structure.108 Restricting participation to academic scientists—a prominent feature of our proposal—should prove attractive
from the firms’ perspective.
Moreover, even with respect to academic researchers, access to molecules
would remain quite limited. The trusted intermediary would conduct the highthroughput screening on submitted assays. At Tier 1, academic researchers would
108. See Elizabeth K. Wilson, Is Safe Exchange of Data Possible? Modelers in Need of Proprietary Compounds Seek Ways To Share Information, But Not Structure, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2005, at 24, available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/science/83/8317sci1.html (describing efforts to enable “safe exchange” of chemical structures).
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receive results (and accompanying structural information) only with respect to
molecules that represented hits. In exchange for this information, firms would be
rewarded with the possibility of a collaboration as well as a potential royalty
even if their firm was not chosen to undertake downstream development.
However, leakage of some structural information between firms might occur
in certain circumstances, namely, when an assay revealed hit molecules from two
different firms. If an academic moved on to a Tier 2 collaboration with one firm,
there is some concern that he might inappropriately use information about the
other firm’s molecule(s). Similarly, if Tier 2 negotiations with one firm fell
through, the researcher might take information derived from those negotiations
into conversations with a second firm.
To forestall these possibilities, the framework agreement for the partnership
should explicitly prohibit researchers from using information derived from one
firm in their dealings with another firm. Enforcement of such a provision might
prove difficult, however. Thus, the firm that was not chosen might be best rewarded for the risk of some level of leakage through the contractuallyconstructed liability scheme discussed above.109
B. The Academic Researchers’ Perspective
Researchers, and their universities, should be motivated to participate in the
collaboration through financial incentives and the potential for groundbreaking
discoveries. If academic researchers succeeded in validating a target, they, and
their universities, would find themselves in a strong position to negotiate a favorable Tier 2 agreement with one of the companies contributing hit molecules.
The academics would bring to the table their substantial knowledge of the
assay and target, and the pharmaceutical firm would bring its information concerning the relevant molecule, its expertise in medicinal chemistry, as well as all
of its downstream development resources. If the resulting partnership yielded a
commercially successful drug, the researcher and his university would secure a
share of the revenues.110 They would also secure a reputational gain through
109. See supra Section III.C.
110. Note that this is a different claim from the argument that technology licensing (e.g., patent
licensing) is likely to bring in substantial revenue. As many observers have noted, university patent
licensing generally involves upstream technology with uncertain payoffs and therefore revenues are
typically quite small. Only in the relatively unusual circumstance where the university sells rights
to a drug is the revenue payoff substantial. See, e.g., Press Release, Emory University, Gilead Science and Royalty Pharma Announces $525 Million Agreement with Emory University To Purchase
Royalty Interest for Emtricitabine (July 18, 2005), available at http://www.news.emory.edu/
Releases/emtri/ (describing payment of $525 million for sale of royalty rights to anti-AIDS drug).
Our proposal similarly would involve partnerships dealing with end-product drugs; therefore, reve-
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eventual publication of the breakthrough research.
In our view, these financial and reputational benefits to the public research
community should help to offset delays in publication that participating firms
might deem necessary to protect commercially valuable information. Specifically, as noted earlier, the researcher exploring chemical space at Tier 1 would
have to sign a nondisclosure agreement with respect to any structural data on
molecules that he or she received.111 Additionally, at Tier 2, the researcher must
be willing to forego publication of commercially valuable information until relevant patents (e.g., on promising lead compounds) had been filed.
The ultimate financial benefits should also mitigate certain limitations on
university patenting that are likely corollaries of our proposed public-private
partnership. Under current law, universities are entitled to seek intermediate patents on validated targets. In the proposed collaboration, universities would forgo
such patents in exchange for a transactional commitment at Tier 2 by the pharmaceutical company to a revenue stream from any drug that was ultimately developed. This revenue stream would recognize the significant research contribution of the university and its researcher.
C. The Perspective of the Trusted Intermediary
In order for the proposed public-private partnership to take off, the trusted
intermediary would probably have to provide some seed funding. Specifically,
the intermediary might, at least initially, bear the cost of funding researchers to
develop assays, of conducting high-throughput screening, and of general pool
administration. However, once the concept of pooling small molecule libraries
had proved to be scientifically and economically viable, the firms themselves
should be willing to subsidize many, if not all, of the activities in the collaboration.
If the trusted intermediary were the NIH, or an NIH-funded proxy, our proposal could be seen as complementary to its Molecular Libraries Initiative. While
the MLI is likely to prove very useful in advancing basic knowledge about biological pathways, lack of access to small molecule libraries held by pharmaceutical firms may limit its success in target validation. At a minimum, the MLI will
not typically result in potential lead compounds. More generally, two of the three
themes highlighted in the current NIH Roadmap for Medical Research—
encouraging “new pathways for discovery” and supporting “research teams of the
future,”112 (including interdisciplinary work and public-private partnerships)—
nue payoffs could be substantial.
111. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
112. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH ROADMAP FOR RESEARCH (2006), http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/
pdf/NIHRoadmap-FactSheet-Aug06.pdf.
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are specifically promoted by the terms of our proposal.
The pharmaceutical companies could, of course, foot the bill for the entire
initiative and establish their own trusted intermediary. We believe, however, that
participation of a public entity remains desirable, even if the operation were totally funded by the private sector. For example, the presence of a public-sector
player would greatly simplify relations with academia and add a layer of indirect
enforcement of nondisclosure rules that would reassure the participating firms.
Likewise, a public sector presence would reinforce the academic scientists’ expectations that the public interest in shared research results would ultimately be
respected, without compromising either side’s intellectual property rights. Finally, the presence of a public-sector player would greatly facilitate negotiations
between the trusted intermediary and the antitrust authorities over time.
D. Antitrust Concerns and the Public Interest
If successful, our proposal would necessarily entail some level of collaboration between firms that represent a significant percentage of the pharmaceutical
industry. For the most part, only limited inter-firm R&D coordination or exchange of information would occur–largely confined to contexts where complementary assets had to be deployed in order to maximize research potential. Thus,
we believe that our proposal should pass muster from the standpoint of both
normative economic analysis and antitrust doctrine.
The question of whether a competitive or concentrated (perhaps even monopolistic) market structure best promotes innovation has long been mooted in
the economic literature. Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that concentration
promotes risky innovation by allowing firms to limit diffusion of knowledge to
competitors and thus appropriate more fully the benefits of their innovative efforts.113 In contrast, Kenneth Arrow and others have asserted that monopoly
power can dull incentives to innovate, particularly in situations where a new
product would displace a product already produced by the monopolist.114
As antitrust doctrine has expanded its focus beyond end product markets, it
too has examined the relationship between competition and innovation. Influenced by Arrow’s work, in the mid-1990’s the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted an “innovation markets” analysis, which looks at competition in the R&D processes that
produce end products.115 Under innovation markets analysis, a joint venture, li113. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (1942).
114. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 32. For a summary of these arguments, see Rai, supra note 26,
at 824-25.
115. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.3 (1995) [hereinafter DOJ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], available at
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censing agreement, or merger is suspect if it unduly limits the number of competing innovators and yields no offsetting innovation-related efficiencies.
Although innovation markets analysis might imply a relatively strict review
of R&D collaborations, the DOJ and FTC have emphasized how difficult it is to
define an innovation market.116 In practice, the overriding focus in most cases is
not market definition but whether the collaboration is likely to accelerate or slow
the pace at which R&D efforts are pursued.117 The agencies specifically recognize that “[t]hrough the combination of complementary assets, technology, or
know how, an R&D collaboration may enable participants more quickly or more
efficiently to research and develop new or improved goods . . . .”118
In the case of our proposed collaboration, the reality that R&D on new drug
targets is very expensive and risky should make antitrust authorities more disposed towards a Schumpeterian perspective on the resulting pharmaceutical innovation. Nonetheless, two aspects of our model might concern antitrust regulators. First, the optional liability rule scheme we have proposed might be seen as a
reach-through royalty that dulled incentives on the part of the firm enjoying the
royalty to innovate independently. However, we think it is unlikely that a small
royalty stream would significantly affect such incentives. The situation where no
one works on a molecule that modulates a new target is much more likely. Indeed, it is the status quo.
The second antitrust difficulty might involve the situation where coownership of molecules required a substantial compensatory royalty or even a
joint venture. In both cases, the argument in favor of allowing collaboration
would rest on the fact that the assets in question were co-owned and therefore
complementary.
To address antitrust concerns expeditiously, we would propose that the initial framework agreement expressly address questions of co-ownership (and, if
desired, liability rules), and that this agreement be vetted by the antitrust authorities before any collaborative work began. The PSTC framework agreement provides an instructive example. It contains an “antitrust statement” that limits interfirm sharing of information to that necessary for purposes of biomarker validahttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (defining innovation markets); see also DEP’T
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS § 3.32(c) (2000) [hereinafter DOJ, COLLABORATION], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (discussing innovation markets).
116. “The Agencies will delineate an innovation market only when the capabilities to engage in
the relevant research and development can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics
of specific firms.” DOJ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 115, § 3.2.3; see also DOJ,
COLLABORATION, supra note 115, § 3.32(c).
117. DOJ, COLLABORATION, supra note 115, § 3.31(a).
118. Id.
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tion and allows consortium members to pursue independent biomarker validation
projects.119 We would envision a similar statement addressing antitrust concerns
in our framework agreement.
CONCLUSION: BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
In developing our proposal for greater access to small molecule libraries, we
have drawn upon models of inter-firm collaboration that the pharmaceutical industry is currently using for biomarkers. However, our approach is designed to
work in settings different from the creation of biomarker standards, where rights
in collaborative outputs must be tightly protected.
For example, a similar approach maybe be useful in advanced materials engineering research. Such research represents a context where inter-firm transfer
120
of inchoate and unpatented, but nonetheless valuable, information is desirable.
Contract-based exchange can be implemented so long as the connection between
the inchoate information put in ex ante and the codified, differentiated information that emerges ex post is reasonably clear. The presence of a trusted intermediary that polices contract breaches and prevents undesirable spillovers is also
important.
Our proposal attempts to embody all the features that are likely to facilitate
contract-based exchanges of pre-patentable, but nonetheless valuable, information. If academics and pharmaceutical firms are interested in truly innovative
drug discovery, they should experiment with this effort to forge new and viable
pathways across what has hitherto proved to be a largely impassable “valley of
death.”

119. See Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, at exhibit A.
120. Professor Krishna Rajan, Iowa State University, Presentation at the University of Tokyo
Conference on Designing Global Information Commons for Innovation in Frontier Sciences (Nov.
8, 2007) (conference notes on file with authors).
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